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This paper presents a simple system for e¢ cient regulation under
asymmetric information. Each rms income is controlled by a tax
that depends on the rms own output and on a parameter construed
as a share permit. These "shares of total expected output" lower a
rms tax burden and are acquired in a competitive market. By em-
ploying this scheme, the planner only requires knowledge of marginal
damage to induce the rst-best outcome. Relative to a traditional
cap-and-trade approach the system increases expected social welfare.
If incentives for strategic behavior in the market exist, their impact
may be scaled down.
Keywords: Asymmetric information; Taxation; Tradable permits;
JEL classication: Q58, H41, D82
1 Introduction
As a planning instrument, price controls had been considered superior to
quantity regulation for decades until the publication of Weitzmans (1974)
article, "Prices vs. Quantities." The prevailing view among economists today
is that either instrument may prove superior over the other. In most cases,
however, when information is held asymmetrically, both of these single modes
of control fail to attain the optimal outcome. To obtain such e¢ ciency, a
scheme combining tax and quantity regulation might be used. A scheme
in that line is proposed by Weitzman (1978). In his "Optimal Rewards for
Economic Regulation" model, he uses a quadratic function to penalize each
rm for deviating from a prescribed individual quota target. Because this
penalty function does not induce a strictly monotonic demand for quotas,
however, quota holdings cannot be subject to voluntary exchanges between
rms. The fact that each optimal quota value must therefore be explicitly
determined by the planner levies a rather heavy informational burden on
him/her.
In this article, we ll a gap in the theory of regulation by introducing a
hybrid system of taxation and tradable share permits. This system di¤ers
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from Weitzmans (1978) original model by the argument of the marginal tax
function facing each rm.1 While he uses a di¤erence (ei   qi) where ei is a
rm is emissions and qi its quota target, we plug in a quotient (ei=si) where
si is a share permit parameter. This distinction implies that we are able
to reduce the planners information needs. Operating with a share parame-
ter, interpreted as the expected emissions of the rm divided by the total
expected emissions of the industry, lessens the planners informational bur-
den because he/she is not required to form any expectation at all regarding
total emissions in absolute quantity terms. And because the tax becomes a
strictly decreasing function of the individual share permit holding, the shares
we dene are tradable. Hence, by employing a market for share permits the
planner may also avoid having to estimate an e¢ cient distribution of shares.
All in all, when the planner is able to perfectly observe emissions and
share permit holdings at the rm level, he/she must only be aware of the
marginal damage to be able to implement our hybrid system of taxation and
tradable share permits. Competitive behavior in the permit market will then
ensure an ex post optimal distribution of share permits. As in Weitzmans
(1978) scheme, each rm will then face a tax schedule that internalizes the
damage it causes and the rm will therefore also select the emission level
that makes its outcome ex post e¢ cient. In this equilibrium, the amount
that each rm is willing to allocate for permits and the amount that it pays
for its emissions add up to the total amount the company would spend when
facing a full information Pigouvian unit tax.
Roberts and Spences (1976) mixed system of tradable quantities and lin-
ear taxation may also achieve ex post e¢ ciency when information is limited to
marginal damage. However, because the planner must rely on linear tax seg-
ments to approximate the damage function, he/she must employ a multiple
of these segments to accurately emulate the damage function. This appears
di¢ cult from a practical standpoint because it requires that the planner is-
sues a continuum of license types that would each clear at di¤erent prices.
1Weitzman also assumes that the damage a rm imposes on the environment by dis-
charging emissions is independent of the damage caused by other rms. We, on the other
hand, follow the standard approach that the industry creates environmental damages that,
in monetary terms, are a strictly convex function of the sum of emissions across rms.
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Alternatively, each type of permit could be rented at various prices (Collinge
and Oates, 1982), or a menu of options could be issued (Unold and Requate,
2001).2
Compared to the alternatives mentioned above, the scheme we propose
is unique in that it uses a traditional market mechanism to achieve the ex
post e¢ ciency goal. Arguably, such an exchange market is easier to use in
practice. As is customary, that market is continuously open for trades, there
is only a single type of license, and the supply of licenses is xed.
A xed supply of permits does not always ensure competitive behavior.
As Hahn (1984) andWestskog (1996) show for the case of a traditional permit
market, welfare losses may accrue due to the strategic behavior of dominating
rms. Comparably, however, it turns out that our modication may reduce
the ability of the big polluters to exercise market power.
Some of the mechanisms proposed in the literature (e.g. Dasgupta et
al., 1980; Montero, 2008) have the advantage of being able to implement an
e¢ cient allocation of permits in dominant strategies. On the other hand,
such strategy-proof mechanisms belong to a category of designs that can be
applied solely at discrete points in time where at each instant the planner
has to communicate with rms. These methods are certainly suitable for
implementing an initial allocation of permits, but they might be costly if
they were to be used repeatedly.3
Section 2 is the main section of this paper. It spells out in detail the
scheme we propose under the assumption of optimizing and price taking be-
havior on the part of all rms. The two next sections are dedicated to a
comparison of the system with the traditional cap-and-trade approach. Sec-
tion 3 focuses on the implications for social welfare, while Section 4 focuses
on the e¢ ciency of the system if some rms are allowed to behave strategi-
cally in the permit market. Before the last section concludes, it presents a
2Some other approaches to the same end require each rm to have complete information
on certain (static or dynamic) Nash equilibrium outcomes. In the scheme suggested by
Kim and Chang (1993) it pertains to the sum of emissions across other rms, in Duggan
and Roberts(2002) proposal it pertains to the emission of the rms "neighbor", while in
Varians (1994) scheme it concerns the Pigovian tax level.
3Strategy-proof methods can be wasteful because the process of gathering and handling
information when there are many agents in practice can be very resource intensive.
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discussion of the mechanism and outlines an application to greenhouse gas
mitigation policies.
2 Mixing fees and share permits
There is a nite number n of rms, each of which emits a homogeneous
pollutant into (local or global) commons. We assume that each rm is an
entity that maximizes prots by being well-informed about the data pertain-
ing directly to itself. In the absence of regulation, company i (= 1; ::; n) has
benets B0i of discharging emissions e
0
i  0. When rms are subject to con-
trol, each rm i reduces emission to 0  ei  e0i . The remaining private gross
benets are then given by the function Bi (ei) which satises Bi (e0i ) = B
0
i ,
B0i (ei) > 0 and B
00
i (ei) < 0, and furthermore, Inada conditions B
0
i (0) = 1
and B0i (1) = 0.4
We write e :=
P
ei as shorthand for the aggregate emission level. Let
aggregate economic damage caused by emissions as measured in monetary
terms be given by the functionD (e) where we assume that D (0) = 0, D0 > 0
and D00 > 05.









The necessary optimality condition for interior solutions is
B0i (ei) = D
0 (e) (2)
for all i. Since the objective in problem (1) is strictly concave, condition (2)
is also su¢ cient, and the optimum is unique.
Environmental regulation is performed by a benevolent central planner
bestowed with the authority to implement an e¢ cient enforcement system of
4The Inada conditions are included for simplicity as they ensure interior solutions in
some of the optimization problems that follows.
5The case in which D00 = 0 is trivial. It is well known that the rst-best optimum in
this case is attained by a linear tax equal to D0.
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his/her own design. In this endeavor, he/she must contend with only know-
ing the damage function D (). Since each benet function Bi () represents
private information, the planner will a priori only have a vague idea (or have
no knowledge at all) about optimal emission levels. We posit, though, that
he/she can perfectly observe each rm is discharge ei in the aftermath.
We introduce an important part of our mechanism, a specic tax func-
tion, by looking at three increasingly weaker assumptions about the control
position:
Case 1: The regulators task would be relatively straightforward if only one
rm were polluting. Then, by charging
R e
0
D0(x)dx = D(e) as a total indem-
nity, the company would internalize the damage it creates and voluntarily
choose the optimal emission.6
Case 2: If the planner, in the case of an industry with n equal rms, had sim-
ply charged each of them for their share of total damages 1=nD (e), the tax
amount levied on each rm would have been dependent on the action of other
rms. Consequently companies would have faced strategic concerns and thus
played a game where the outcome would have been an ine¢ cient Nash equi-
librium. To avoid such behavior, each tax levied should depend solely on a
rms own emissions. Thus, in the "n equal rms"-case, the solution is to let
the regulator specify individual tax functions as
R ei
0
D0(nx)dx = 1=nD (nei).
Noticing that equal eis would assure e = nei, we can discern that rm i in
this case would face the same tax rate D0 (nei) as the regulated company in
a one-polluter industry. As a result, optimal discharges would be realized.
Case 3: A broader interpretation can be conjectured. If the planner were
in the possession of adequate information to perfectly foresee the relation
between the ex post optimal emissions of rms, - the share 1=n introduced
above would be replaced by an optimal parameter si that the planner would
be able to assign for each rm. That parameter should be interpreted as rm
6This is proposed by Loeb and Magat (1979) in the context of regulating the output
of a monopoly.
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is holding of share permits, or its allocated share of the total expected emis-
sions of the industry7, of which there is a total of
P
si := 1. The individual
tax function is now formulated as8














where, as previously stated, ei is the amount of pollutant emitted by rm
i. This tax function - together with the optimal share distribution - would,
as in the "n equal rms" case, ensure a series of optimal choices within the
industry.
As assumed in this paper, however, the planner knows nothing about the
rmsbenet functions. Therefore, he/she cannot directly expedite an ef-
cient share distribution. But the planner can circumvent the information
problem. Recall that D0 > 0. This implies that the rate of the tax (3) levied
upon rm i, @ti=@ei = D0 (ei=si), increases with its argument ei=si so that a
higher si value for constant ei means a lower marginal tax. Thus, a high si
is worthwhile to the rm. We can then presume the following mechanism.
First of all, the tax function (3) that the planner will commit to is an-
nounced to the parties. Then an initial allocation of the xed supply
P
si = 1
of share certicates is e¤ectuated, e.g., through an auction or they may be
given away for free (grandfathering). Subsequently, exchanges may take place
on a permit market. Firm is holding of si is veriable from a central register
at the moment the planner nally calculates the tax (3) on realized emissions.
In this two-stage sequential mechanism, in the second stage rm i chooses
emissions according to
Vi (si) = max
ei0
[Bi (ei)  T (ei; si)] . (4)
where Vi (si) is the value of share holding si. The necessary optimality con-
7A more formal denition of this parameter is presented in the next section.
8This tax function formulation is valid for si > 0. When si = 0 and ei = 0 then
ti = T (0; 0) = 0, and when si = 0 and ei > 0 then the tax ti = T (0; ei) should be set as
high as possible.
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dition for interior solutions to (4) using (3) is







which denes ei = ei (si). Since the objective in problem (4) is strictly
concave, condition (5) is also su¢ cient, and the optimum is unique.
Assume there are a su¢ cient number of rms, each small enough that it
is a reasonable approximation to treat them as price-taking agents. In the
rst stage rm i trade shares in the market solving the decision problem9
max
si0
fVi (si)  sig (6)
where  is the market-clearing price per unit of si. The necessary optimality
condition for interior solutions10 to (6) is  = V 0i (si), which, by the Envelope















which is positive by the strict convexity ofD. Since V 00i (si) =  D00 (ei=si) e2i /s3i <
0 it follows that the objective in problem (6) is strictly concave. Hence, con-
dition (7) is both necessary and su¤cient, and the optimum unique.
Proposition 1 Suppose the constraint
P
si = 1 is perfectly enforced. Then,





for all i. (8)
Proof. Let ai := ei=si (emissions per share). Equation (7) expresses 
9We can ignore any specication of the initial allocation of permits because it is irrel-
evant for a competitive market (Montgomery, 1972).
10Inada conditions on B ensures an interior solution to (4), i.e. ei > 0. Then si = 0
can be ruled out as an optimal solution to (6) because in our case we assume that the tax
ti = T (ei; 0) should be set as high as possible (see footnote 7).
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From D00 (ai) > 0 it follows that price  is monotonically increasing with ai.
Because  is constant across rms, rms equate ai = a. If shares sum to
unity this implies a = e. The desired assertion follows.
Equation (7) is the inverse demand function for share permits for rm
i. The demand depends on its emission and consistency (8) implies that in
equilibrium no rm buys more share permits than it needs. The result (8)
also implies that (2) is equivalent to (5) for all i. This entails
Proposition 2 The tax rule (3) and the enforcement of
P
si = 1, yields a
socially optimal level of pollution for all i.
Note that consistency (8) also implies
 = eD0 (e) D (e) (9)
wherefrom follows
Proposition 3 For each rm, the fee (3) plus expenses for si is equal to
T (ei; si) + si = D
0 (e) ei: (10)
This sum matches the tax that each rm would pay facing the full-information
Pigouvian unit tax  := D0(e).
As illustrated in Figure 1, if competitive rms demand rights to pollute
according to the inverse demand function P (e), they end up paying +D(e)
for pollution e; they pay  in shares (the area above the D0(e) curve) and
D(e) in taxes (the area below the D0(e) curve). So what the planner does
by employing the mechanism is to create a perfectly competitive market on
the supply side. The supply of emission permits is as if it were coming from
competitive suppliers with marginal production cost D0(e). In this perfectly
8
Figure 1:
competitive market consuming rms (i.e., consumers of rights) trade in the
market along their true demand for emissions, P (e), like in any other perfectly
competitive market and not along any misreported demand curve like P1 (e)
or something lower for that matter.11
3 Welfare e¤ects
In order to compare welfare consequences for our suggested reform with tra-
ditional quantity regulation, we want to start with a setting in which initial
allocations of permits are given free to rms. Then, both in a traditional
cap-and-trade system and in the system we propose, subsequent nancial
transactions due to purchases and sales on the market can only ow be-
tween rms. Hence, for the planner, the regulatory budget with respect to
the trade process is neutral for both systems. While under the traditional
quantity system there are no further transactions going on,12 our proposal in
Section 2 stipulates that each rm will always pay a tax to the authorities for
emissions. Comparing the systems might therefore be easier if our current
11The author is grateful to Juan-Pablo Montero for suggesting this interpretation.
12We assume then, of course, that all rms comply with their nal permit holdings.
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scheme is extended to incorporate a personal rebate.
First, let us be more specic about the share permit si held by rm i.
It is dened as si := qi=q where qi is the quota holding of rm i and where
q :=
P
qi is the total amount of quotas issued. The personal rebate we
request should ensure that the payment (3) from rm i to the authorities is
nullied when the rm happens to comply with its permit qi. Such a rebate is
equal to the amount determined by the tax function siD (ei=si) when ei = qi.
This sum
ri = R (si; q) := siD (q) (11)
is to be subtracted from rm is original payment (3) to the regulator. So,
instead of the scheme in Section 2, which solely levies a tax on rms, the
current regime now consists of deducting the individual positive or negative
sum
fi = F (ei; si; q) := T (ei; si) R (si; q) : (12)
Because the rebate (11) is solely (and linearly) dependent on si, this
merely causes an increase @ri=@si = D (q) in the price of the share quota.
Denoting this new price as  the altered inverse demand function for share
permits can be written as  = +D (q) where  is the "pure tax system" price
given by equation (7). With the rebate being independent on ei, it is easy
to show that Proposition 1 still holds ground, and consequently, Proposition
2 does also. The corresponding Proposition 3, indicating that fi + si =
D0 (e) ei, is also true.
Propositions 1 and 2 are valid, of course, even if the subject of exchange is
the permit itself qi (rather than the share permit si = qi=q). The permit price
is then given by p = =q, thus rendering the equation (10) of Proposition 3
in this case as fi + pqi = D0 (e) ei. If realizations in that latter case happen
to be ei = qi for all i, the price p would be equal to the permit price that
arises in a conventional cap-and-trade system with q as the total amount of
quotas issued.
As mentioned above, when initial quotas are given free to rms in a cap-
and-trade system, the regulatory budget thereafter is null. The total amount
of quotas issued with optimal use of this traditional instrument would be the
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quantity that maximizes expected welfare (Weitzman, 1974). This ex ante
optimal quantity might also be a natural choice for a planner aiming to
minimize the expected deviation between q and the realized outcome e =P
ei in our regime. But this choice of q in the rebated scheme, which will
give the planner an anticipated distribution of total pollution around the
expected value, will not be budget-neutral for him/her in the long run. The
expected budget will be strictly positive simply because each rms tax (the
deducted amount (12) when fi > 0) for exceeding the quota qi by a certain
quantity is higher than the reward (the deducted amount when fi < 0) for
emitting the quota less the same amount. So a switch to our ex post e¢ cient
rebated scheme (12) with grandfathering on average generates revenue for
the regulator. Comparably this means an increase in expected social welfare.
That expected gain would of course also be present if, for instance, per-
mits are initially allocated through an auction. Applying the "pure tax"
regime of Section 2 would also make no di¤erence in this respect. The re-
bate (11) is just a tool for the redistribution of welfare from the government
to the industry. The planner may for instance want to transfer all the ex-
tra expected prot to the industry to avoid the prospect that rm owners
and/or employees will oppose the implementation of the scheme (Buchanan
and Tullock, 1975). The planner can then simply increase the grandfathered
amount q to the level which leads to the expected budget-neutrality for the
authorities.
4 Imperfect permit markets
The previous assumption that all rms exhibit price taking behavior in a
market with a xed supply may sometimes be a reasonable approximation,
as in the case of controlling emissions in industries under the European Union
Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS).13 The suggested implementation might,
13"The EU ETS was launched on January 1, 2005 as a cornerstone of EU climate
policy towards its Kyoto commitment and beyond. Through the EU ETS, Member States
allocate part of the e¤orts towards their Kyoto targets to private sector emission sources
(mostly utilities). Over 200812, emissions from mandated installations (about 40% of EU
emissions) are capped on average at 6% below 2005 levels." Kossoy and Ambrosi (2010).
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however, also be useful if rms were allowed to exercise market power. It is
a fact that strategic behavior might lead to ine¢ ciencies in any market with
a uniform price. Nevertheless, given the same initial distribution of permits,
losses due to market power can be lower with our system compared to the
levels that for instance Hahn (1984) and Westskog (1996) predicts for the
traditional cap-and-trade system. A simple argument supporting this view
is that the competitive fringe of rms in our regime has the option to utilize
the exibility of the system for their own benet. This option might be used
in following way:
Proposition 4 If the price of share permits is higher (lower) than in com-
petitive equilibrium, a rational price-taking rm will buy a lower (higher)
amount of share permits than the amount that corresponds to the quantity it
chooses to emit.
Proof. For all rms, the condition (5) B0i (ei) = D
0 (ei/ si) implicitly
denes the emission reaction function ei (si). Di¤erentiation of this function
with respect to si as well as manipulation to obtain the elasticity of ei with






D00 (ei/ si)  siB00i (ei)
Since D00 > 0 and B00i < 0, the elasticity Elsi (ei) is always less than one.
Hence, the emissions level is relatively inelastic with respect to a change in
the share permit holding. Because a competitive rm only buys more share
permits than the amount that corresponds to what it emits when the price
is lower than in competitive equilibrium and vice versa, the desired assertion
follows.
As explained by Hahn (1984), a dominant buyer (seller) of permits in a
traditional quantity system may nd it protable to understate (overstate)
his demand in order to force down (up) the price of permits below (above)
the competitive price. Relative to a conventional system that undertakes a
one-to-one relationship between individual emissions and permits, a compet-
itive fringe that behaves as predicted by Proposition 4 is less inclined to sell
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share permits at low prices, as well as less inclined to buy share permits at
high prices. The strategic rm anticipates this and will comparably lower
its tendency to understate (overstate) demand in the rst place. Hence,
a dominant rms manipulation e¤orts within our scheme can only be less
successful.
5 Discussion and conclusion
This paper introduces a simple yet powerful tool for controlling a multiple-
rm industry creating strictly convex damages. When individual emissions
can be observed and the market for share permits is fully competitive, a
regulator can induce the rst-best optimum by merely knowing the marginal
damage on the environment. Each rm can act devoid of problems with
information and strategic choice. While taxation leads rms to internalize
environmental costs, the market mechanism of the scheme ensures optimal
distribution of damage payments.
Even though the tax function facing an individual rm is non-linear, its
total payment equals that caused by the linear Pigouvian tax that would
have been used by a planner having full knowledge of private benets. The
overall scheme can thus be construed as a linear tax regime in which rms
themselves choose the optimal total emissions and thereby also the optimal
linear tax level. An alternative interpretation is that the supply of permits
is as if it were coming from competitive suppliers with marginal production
cost equal to marginal damage.
In the case in which some rms have market power, we demonstrate that
the proposed system might be more e¢ cient compared to the traditional
cap-and-trade system. This is due to the fact that small rms may nd it
more protable to deviate from the quota-emission relationship, rather than
being exploited by the manipulative tactics of big polluters. So importantly,
the introduction of our scheme does not make possible new types of strategic
rm behavior in the permit market. On the contrary, if incentives for such
behavior exist, the impact of them may be scaled down.
When we in Section 3 introduce a rebate that depends on ex ante ex-
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pected emissions, we show that our proposal may be regarded as a traditional
cap-and-trade system that makes use of optimal rules for enforcement. The
original concept of cap-and-trade is rapidly gaining acceptance worldwide as
the main principle for handling externalities when information is imperfect
and held asymmetrically. The idea has political appeal because, among other
things, the binding commitment to not exceed a predetermined emission level
provides an easily perceived ex ante measure of environmental progress. In
practice, however, a strategy for enforcement has to be designed. Tradition-
ally such enforcement consists of imposing a nancial penalty on a rm that
exceeds its quota holding. Under our assumption about perfect observations
this ne should be equal to the damage caused by the o¤ense (Polinsky and
Shavell, 2000). But this is exactly what our rebated scheme prescribes. In
addition we nd that the optimal enforcement regime also implies that the
planner should grant a reward to those rms that realize emissions below
their targeted amount.
Compared side-by-side with a traditional cap-and-trade system where all
rms comply, we show that a switch to a regime with optimal enforcement
rules increases social welfare. Since the scheme uses shares of total expected
discharges as the unit for trade on the market, the planner is not required to
form any expectation at all about the outcome in absolute quantity terms.
But as said, he/she may use that information to determine a rebate that
together with grandfathering becomes a tool that redistributes gain from the
authorities to the industry.
What we can say about the e¢ ciency of the system di¤ers only slightly
in the case in which we allow for (independent) uncertainty about damage
caused by the industry. The damage function we use throughout this article
would then have to be replaced by a function of the expected damage caused
by the total of realized emissions, and the outcome would be second-best
e¢ cient rather than rst-best (Kaplow and Shavell, 2002)14.
One application of our system might be to tackle climate change. Due
to the generic feature of greenhouse gases as stock pollutants it is often as-
14Kaplow and Shavell (2002) investigate the case of regulating a one-rm industry with
a non-linear tax.
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sumed that the marginal damage curve is relatively at in the relevant range
of emission reductions. Then, in accordance with Weitzman (1974), price
control is preferred to quantity regulation. In fact, simulations by Pilzer
(2002) indicate that expected welfare gain may be ve times higher with an
optimal price policy than with its quantity policy counterpart. Dispite this,
and as already mentioned above, policy makers still tend to regard quan-
tity regulation as more appealing. A rationale for such a choice might be
based on two arguments. Firstly it seems to be an agreement between cli-
mate researchers that the probability of irreversable, abrupt and catastrophic
damages as global temperature rises is nonnegligible. There is therefore a
chance that the sum of a specic years discharges of greenhouse gases into
the atmosphere breaches the critical concentration threshold causing dramat-
ically increased damages such as the loss of the Greenland ice sheet and the
West Antartic ice sheet (Notz, 2009). This corresponds to an expected dam-
age function which is strictly convex and is smooth due to the uncertainty
about the threshold level. So again in accordance with Weitzman (1974),
to assume the presence of catastrophic events can reverse the preference for
price control. Secondly plausible scenarios of statistical dependence between
rmsmarginal benets and marginal damages consist to a greater extent of
examples of positive rather than negative correlation (Stavins, 1996). And
positive correlation may indeed tip the preference in favor of quantity controls
(Weitzman, 1974).
A country which has ratied the Kyoto Protocol may give high priority
to comply with the agreement by minimizing the di¤erence between realized
emissions and the targeted amount (Quirion, 2010). But this is precisely the
goal that governs our optimal enforcement regime. Since polluters are often
unable to control their emissions with any great degree of accuracy, a regime
only imposing nes to rms that exceeding their quota amount may to a
lesser degree be able to fulll that goal.
Although our instrument is presented in the static context of limiting a
homogeneous pollutant discharged by an industry with multiple rms, the
scheme may apply equally well when marginal damage varies across space
(Montgomery, 1972; Muller and Mendelson, 2009). It might be applicable to
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other types of economic activities in need of regulation under the presence
of asymmetric information including e.g. the dual problem of regulat-
ing e¤ects of positive externalities. And our approach might be useful in a
dynamic context, for instance as a tool for regulating catches in demersal
sheries (This Author, 2010).
With our proposal we advance Weitzmans (1978) mechanism by intro-
ducing share permits that can be traded on a market. Our schemes exibility
might be invaluable for regulatory practice; moreover, it improves social wel-
fare. Furthermore, the system has low information requirements while being
as potentially easy to implement as a traditional cap-and-trade system. The
latter argument is a unique feature of our ex post e¢ cient implementation
method.
None of the options suggested in the literature for implementing ex post
e¢ cient systems have to our knowledge been adapted for practical use. One
reason for this gap perhaps can be traced to a common understanding that
the proposed methods may result in "considerable administrative di¢ culties"
(Myles, 1995). The scheme proposed in this paper hopefully reverses this
conception.
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